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THE PITTSBURG-ALLEGHENY CONSOLIDATION
CASES
On April 20th, 1905,1 an act was passed whose object
was expressed in its first few lines. "Be it enacted, etc.,
that where two cities, situate in the same county, are or
may be contiguous to each other, the city having the smaller population, as shown by the last preceding United States
census, may be annexed to the city having the larger population as shown by said census in the following manner,"
etc. On Feb. 7th, 1906,2 in an extraordinary session of the
legislature, another act was passed which enacted "that
whenever in this commonwealth now or hereafter, two cities
shall be contiguous or in close proximity to each other, the
two, with any intervening land other than boroughs may
be united and become one by annexing and consolidating
the lesser city, and the intervening land other than botoughs, if any, with the greater city, and thus making one
consolidated city, if at an election, to be held as hereinafter
provided, there shall be a majority of all the votes cast in
favor of such union."
1p. L.

221.

PP. L. 7
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Within a few weeks after the passage of the first of
these acts, citizens and taxpayers of the territory to be affected by it, filed a bills in the. Supreme Court to restrain
the city of Pittsburg, its mayor, the president of its select,
and the president of its common council from taking any
proceedings under the act. The ground upon which the
injunction was asked was that the act was unconstitutional
as being a local and special law regulating the affairs of
cities, and violating Art. 3, Sect. 7 of the constitution.
Did it regulate the affairs of cities? Mestrezat, J. replies "There can be no doubt that the Act of 1905 regulates
4
the 'affairs of cities' in contemplation of the constitution."
The next and more difficult question is, is the act local
and special?
Cities form only a small part of the area of the state.
Legislation then affecting alike even all the cities, would
in a sense be local. If an act, said Mercur, C. J. "apply
to the whole state it is general. If to a part only, it is local. As a legal principle it is as effectually local when it
applies to 65 counties out of the 67, as if it applied to one
county only. " 5 But, since the constitution recognizes cities,
boroughs, counties, etc., it has not been understood to forbid
legislation applicable to cities, because not applicable to
Only that legislation concerning
boroughs or townships.
the affairs of cities is local, which is made applicable to
some; but not to all cities.
But is all legislation applicable to cities local or special
It plainly is in the
unless it is applicable to all cities?
only definable sense of the word "local" or "special." A
statute intended to operate and hence operating only on
Harrisburg, but not on Reading, or Altoona, or Lancaster,
is plainly local and special. It cannot matter how its operativeness is thus restrained, whether by the use in defining
the subject, of the name Reading, or of a description by its
3Sample vs. Pittsburg, 212 Pa. 533.
4Brown, J. tacitly assumes the same in
217 Pa. 227.
5Davis vs. Clark, 106 Pa. 377.

Pittsburg's Petition;
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geographical position, its topography, the county in which
it is, conspicuous facts in its history. If an act is intended
to operate on two, three, six cities, and not on all, it is possible to find some common quality or qualities of these
cities, to give them a class name on account of their possession of these common qualities, and to legislate for cities
of the class so defined. That legislation would be as truly
local or special as if the names of the existing cities having
those qualities were used.
That the same legislation would not be appropriate to
all cities was early perceived by the legislature, and by the
courts. The legislature thought, in 1874, that one kind of
legislation would be suitable for Philadelphia, another for
Pittsburg, and still another for the other cities. Believing
that it could not pass a law frankly applicable to Philadelphia alone, at any time during the life of the law, as would
be the case, did the law name Philadelphia as its subject,
it invented the plan of classification. It adopted population
as the principle of classification. Cities having more than
300,000 people, were termed by it, cities of the first class;
those between 100,000 and 300,000, were termed cities of
the second class; those between 10,000 and 100,000, were
termed cities of the third class. This classification, as we
have said was adopted as a cloak to conceal the localness of
legislation designed for Philadelphia, the sole city falling
within the first class, and Pittsburg, the only one within the
second class.
The suggested justification for this evasion of the constitution was the necessity of having different laws for
Philadelphia, Pittsburg, and the other cities, and the necessity of feigning respect, at the same time, for the prohibition of the constitution.
The absolute necessity of different laws for different
cities was thus forcibly stated by Paxson, J.6 "If the classification of cities is in violation of the constitution, it follows of necessity, that Philadelphia, as a city of the first
GWheeler vs.

Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338.
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class, must be denied the legislation necessary to its present prosperity and future development, or that the small
inland cities must be burdened with legislation wholly unsuited to their needs. For, if the constitution means what
the complainants aver that it does, Philadelphia can have
no legislation that is not common to all other cities of the
state. And for this there is absolutely no remedy but a
change in the organic law itself." Amendment by the
people is a more difficult process than construction by the
legislature and the courti; so construction, not amendment
is the eligible remedy.
The mere fact that an act is applicable to but one city
for the time being, is not decisive that it is unconstitutional.
"Classification," says Paxson, J., "does not depend on number. The first man, Adam, was as distinctly a class, when
the breath of life was breathed into him, as at any subsequent period." 7 The possibility that another city would
enter the first class, is adverted to, as an answer to the complaint that legislation for cities of the first class, containing
but one city, is local. "It is true the only city in the state,
at the present time containing a population of 300,000 is
the city of Philadelphia," said Paxson, J., in 1875. "It is
also true that the city of Pittsburg is rapidly approaching
that number, if it has not already reached it, by recent enlargement of its territory." The ineptitude of this suggestion is strikingly shown. by the subsequent legislation. In
order to keep Pittsburg from getting into the same class
with Philadelphia, the number necessary to form a city of
the first class was, in 1889, raised from 300,000 to 600,000,
and in 1895 from 600,000 to one million. All that the legislature needs to do, to furnish legislation thai shall always
be applicable to Philadelphia alone, is to increase the minimum of inhabitants from time to time, so long is Philadelphia continues to be the most populous city.
Concerning the Pittsburg consolidation act of April
7'rheeler vs. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.
'I
delphia, 156 Pa. 554.

33S; Cf.

Perkins vs.

Phila-
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20th, 1905, it may be remarked that it makes no use of the
recognized classification of cities. It applies in terms to
cities both of the first, both of the second, both of the
third, one of the first and the other of the second, one of
the first, and the other of the third, one of the second and
the other of the third. No reference is made to this circumstance by the writer of the opinion which denounces
the act as local and special.8
He remarks "The statute is operative 'where two cities
Its provisions
are contiguous and in the same county.'
can be invoked to annex only two cities, and when they are
thus situated." Was the act local, because it provided for
the union of two, but not of three or four cities? We are
not informed. However, the writer approved the act of
1906, although it likewise provided for the union of only
two cities.
Is it the fact that the act of 1905 provides for the union
of contiguous cities only and not of incontiguous that makes
the act improperly local and special? The writer of the
opinion does not venture to suggest, that the classification
of cities according as they are, or are not contiguous, is an
inadmissable classification; when its object is to make provision for fusion. It would be quite too absurd to hold that
the legislature may not provide for the union of cities that
touch each other, without at the same time providing for
the union of cities a mile, 5 miles, 10 miles, 50 miles apart.
MorEover, the act of 1906, which has been approved by the
writer of the opinion under examination, confines its operation to cities which are "contiguous or in close proximity to
each other."
Is it the fact that the act operates only on two cities
which are in the same county that condemns it? Apparently. "It therefore," says Mestrezat, 3., "excludes from its
provisions and denies its privileges to all cities separated
by a county line, or which are not wholly within the same
county, although occupying contiguous territory. *
SSample vs. Pittsburg, 212 Pa. 533.
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This distinction made in the act between the cities of the
commonwealth, is not based upon necessity, nor upon any
grounds which the law (i. e. we, the judges) recognize as
justifying classification." This apparently is the ground
of offence.
But, is the distinction between cities in the same county
and cities in different counties, with reference to their amalgamation, appreciably any more unreasonable than that
between contiguous and incontiguous cities. It is at least
unusual that one city or one borough is in part in one and
in part in another county; that its territory is wholly within
one city or borough, and at the same time partially within
If the legislature
one county and partially in another.
thought fit to promote union of cities in one county, but
not, of cities in different counties, would it be irrational?
Why is the court not as willing to indulge it in the distinction founded on coexistence or not in the same county,
as it is willing to indulge it in the distinction founded on
the magnitude of the space intervening between the cities
to be combined? Upon this highly interesting and vital
question we look in vain for light in the lengthy opinionit covers more than eleven pages. The writer indeed says
this distinction is "not based upon necessity, nor upon any
grounds which the law recognizes as justifying classification," but this means little. What are these grounds addiAnd necessity is simply another
tional to "necessity?"
term for appropriateness, convenience, promotiveness of desirable public ends. 9 To omit to include fragments of two
counties in one municipality, seems to us not unjustifiable,
even when provision is made for combining fragments of
the same county in one municipality. We may remember
with advantage the observation of Mitchell, J.10 "Where
the classification is based on genuine distinctions, its expediency is for legislative determination," or again, his declaration; "Classification is a legislative question, subject to
9Cf. Commonwealth vs. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504.
loStegmaier vs. Jones, 203 Pa. 47; Cf. Cam vs. Moir, 199 Pa.
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judicial revision only so far as to see that it is founded on
real distinctions in the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading the
constitutional prohibition. If the distinctions are genuine,
the courts cannot declare the classificaeion void, though
they may not consider it to be on a sound basis. The test
is, not wisdom, but good faith in the classification."
The
remarks of Beaver, J., upon the undesirability of putting a
part of one city into one county, and a part into another,
by a fusion of a borough into a city, are applicable, when
the fusion is of city and city. Il
Much of the opinion indicates that the fact that the
amalgamation of Pittsburg and Allegheny was the immediate present object of the legislature and that it adopted the
general phraseology of the act of 1905, in order primarily
to compass this object is deemed sufficient to condemn the
statute as local and special. We know, says Mestrezat, J.,
"that the cities of Allegheny and Pittsburg in Allegheny
county are the only two contiguous cities in the state, and
that there are no two contiguous cities in any other county
in the state. The act therefore is limited to these two
cities, and the effect or result of the legislation is the same,
and the act is clearly special as if the names of the two
cities, and the effect or result of the legislation is the
same, and the act is as clearly special as if the names of the
two cities had been written in the statute instead of the periphrase used in the description of the cities subject to its
operation." He confirms his belief that these two cities
were intended, by the statement in the act that cities separated by a stream, river or highway, shall be deemed contiguous.
But, all the legislation for cities of the first class is in11Seabold vs. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318. An act classifying
bridges into those over streams separating counties, used by public,
owned by corporations or private persons, used exclusively for vehicles and foot purposes, and destroyed by ice, flood, etc., or, abandoned by the owners and those not having all of these attributes
and providing for the making of the former class public property,
was held not local or special with respeqt to bridges.
22Sheradan Borough, 34 Super. 639.
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tended for Philadelphia, and it may as well be said that
that name might have been as well used in the legislation
as the periphrases. The answer to the scruple is furnished
by the decision from which he did not dissent in Pittsburg's Petition. '- "That it applies now," says Brown, J.,
"and for the present can apply, only to the cities of Pittsburg and Allegheny, and that it was passed for them, can
make no difference, if the legislation is general in form
and substance, and is not within the prohibition of the constitution: Wheeler vs. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338. Individual needs and requirements are responsible for much legislation which now must be general, and when it is so, the
causes that lead to it or the particular purposes it is to
serve at the time of its enactment, have nothing to do with
its constitutionality. It may meet at the time of its passage, the wants of but one community, but if, in the future
it will meet these same wants of all other communities, the
legislation is as general as if at the time of its passage,
there had been no special reason calling for it."
It may be remarked that Mestrezat, J., persuaded himself that the act of 1905 was intended for Pittsburg and Allegheny, because he had judicial knowledge, not merely
that there were no other contiguous cities in any county of
the state, but that there were no other contiguous cities in
the state. Logically, then, he should not have joined in
the decision *of Pittsburg's Petition.
Mestrezat, J., refuses to see any merit in the contention that at some time in the future, two other cities may
become contiguous, and therefore the act of 1905 will furnish a method of their amalgamation.
This rise of two
other contiguous cities is a possibility so remote that it
must be excluded from consideration. But, the legislation
for cities of the first and second class has been in existence
for 38 years, and during all that time, no second city has
got within either class, although, in order to avoid such
accession, legislation has been necessary, increasing the re13217 Pa. 22 7.
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quisite population. It must be remembered, too, that the
possibility of two contiguous cities not in the same county,
is scarcely more substantial than that of two contiguous
cities within the same county, yet Mestrezat, J. and all his
colleagues, seem to have found the act of 1906 not unconstitutional. 14
It is now time to call attention to the utter unsubstantialness of the distinction between the two acts one of which
six judges denounced as void, and the other of which, within a few months afterwards, all uphold.
The difference
between the acts is, that the earlier provides for the union
of two contiguous cities in the same county, the other, of
two contiguous cities. Both operate not on all cities, or all
cities of any class, but upon cities which are contiguous to
other cities. This is a serious narrowing of the range of
the act. It applies not to cities 10 miles or 5 miles, or two
miles apart, but to contiguous cities.
Incontiguous cities
are excluded. There are only two such cities in existence.
They happen to be in the same county. If Pittsburg's Petition is to be taken seriously, and does not reverse Sample
vs. Pittsburg (and it professes to do homage to the latter,
by a long quotation) we are to understand that a statute
providing for the amalgamation of two cities, which are
contiguous and in one county, is local and special while one
providing for the junction of two cities which are contiguous, whether they are in the same county or not, is not local or special. So, if any cities at all are to be susceptible
of consolidation, cities in different counties must be allowed
to consolidate.
But, after Pittsburg and Allegheny have been consolidated, which are in the same county, the legislature may
repeal the act of 1906.
Should it ever happen later that
there are two cities separated by a county line, and two contiguous cities within the same county, it will be impossible
to provide for the combination of the latter without making
that of the former possible on the same terms. Unless perhaps, a more practical and sensible view of the effect of
the constitution may gain a foothold in the judicial mind.
14PIttsburg's Petition, 217 Pa. 227.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. ROPER
Murder-Testimony of Wife in Behalf of HusbandCross-examination
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Murder:-Roper's wife testified for him showing an alibi. She
was cross-examined as to having made statements that Roper had
been near the place of the crime when it was committed. She denied having made these statements. The prosecution then offered
proof that she had made them. Objected to, that the wife was thus
virtually made a witness against her husband.
Doyle, for the Plaintiff.
Hoffman, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
C. Davis, J. The act of 1887 specifically states that "neither
husband nor wife shall be competent nor permitted to testify against
each other." The constitution reserves the right for anyone to refuse to testify incriminatingly against himself or herself, but there
Is no rule neither statutory nor at common law which forbids a
wife to testify for her husband In the same manner as If the husband
were testifying for himself, and could demand the reservations provided in the constitution and Act of 1887 above stated.
However, if a party offers testimony in his own behalf and in so
doing makes statements at variance with remarks made previous
to the trial, proof of this variance may be produced to attack the
credibility of the witness. Permission to use cross-examination for
this purpose is almost unlimited. 40 Cyc. 2714; Commonwealth vs.
Rocco, 225 Pa. 113.
When a wife offers testimony for her husband, she automatically
assumes a position similar to her husband, were he testifying instead, and can be cross-examined as to having made statements
inconsistant with those offered at the trial, and proof of this Inconsistency may be produced-Commonwealth vs. Varano, 258 Pa. 445.
Although in the case at bar, the proven inconsistancy of the
wife's statements will diminish her credibility and ultimately be
harmful to her husband's cause, nevertheless she assumes such a
risk when she offers to testify.
Objection is therefore overruled, and proof of the wife's alleged
Inconsistant statements may be Introduced.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
But little need be added to the opinion of the learned court below.
When the husband calls his wife to testify for him, he must
know that her credibility can be attacked in the usual ways. Has
she a bad reputation for veracity? Has she made assertions inconsistent with those she has made as a witness? She can be asked
whether she has not made such inconsistent statements, and, her
denial that she has will not conclude the question. Other persons
may be called to prove that she has made such inconsistent statemeats. Such is the doctrine of Commonwealth vs. Varano, 258 Pa.
442, and so the court below has held.
Judgment affirmed.
IVIECHANICSBURG vs. HOOPER
Decedents' Estates--Real Estate-ablllty of Devisee for Debts of
Deceased Devisor-1917 Fiduciaries Act, Sect. 15, P. L. 476
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For Injury to A from ice on pavement of X, he recovered from
the borough ;500 damages. X has died and 3 years afterwards
Mechanicsburg sues X's estate for his negligent causation of the
injury for which it has been made liable and obtains a judgment.
This is a scire faclas against X's administrator and Hooper, X's
devisee of land, for the purpose of having execution against this
land. The court has permitted the judgment to be obtained against
the administrator, but not against Hooper. Appeal.
Lewis for the Plaintiff.
Hutchison for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FALVELLO, J. The main question presented by the facts for
decision is whether or not the plaintiff had a lien, for the amount
of its judgment against X's administrator, on the land of which X
died, seized and which was devised to Hooper.
It is provided by Sec. 15(a) of the Fiduciaries Act 1917, P. L.
447, that "no debts of a decedent shall remain a lien on the real
estate of such decedent longer than one year after the decease of
such debtor, unless within said period an action for the recovery
thereof be brought against the executor or administrator of such
decedent, etc."
Was X at the time of his death indebted to the plaintiff? This
question may be answered by a quotation from the recent case of
Hollidaysburg Boro. vs. Snyder, 258 Pa. 490, at P. 493, where the
court said "The limitation imposed by the act" (of June 14, 1901,
P. L. 236 whose provisions were practically the same as those in
See. 15 of the Fiduciaries act of 1917) "relates to debts of the de-
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cedent existing at the time of his death, and nothing can be found
in any of its provisions that extends it so far as to bring within its
scope liabilities of any other kind or nature. At the time of the
death of Anna C. Bell" (who owned the property .where the 3rd
party was injured) "there was no legal duty resting on her to pay
the claim of Teresa Green" (the injured party) "which was afterward put to judgment against the borough. Because of its secondary
liability, the borough was supposed to have a right of action over
against the owner of the property as a6 primary debtor. But, this
was at most unacknowledged and unliquidated so far as it concerned
Anna C. Bell. Whether there was any legal liability upon her had
not been ascertained and steps had been taken to determine that
question. Until determined by a judgment obtained, whether amicably or by suit is immaterial, it remained simply a claim with none
of the characteristics of a debt."
In the case at bar X died and three years afterwards the plaintiff sued his estate for his negligent causation of the Injury. It is
clear, therefore, that at the time of his death, X was not the plaintiff's debtor as respects the claim in this case. It was merely an
unllquidated claim against X, which at his death did not become
a lien on his real estate. Therefore, Hooper, X's devisee, took the
land free from any liability whatsoever for the payment of the
plaintiff's claim.
Since the plaintiff's claim was not a debt and, therefore, not a
lien on X's real estate, the proceedings under scire facias against
the administrator of X's estate and Hooper were of no effect whatever.
The decision we make in this case, only concerns
the plaintiff's
right to charge the land devised to Hooper with a 1in for its claim.
The judgment obtained by plaintiff against X's estate for the amount
for which it was made liable to A in his action against It is not
affected by this decision.
The judgment entered against X's administrator in the seire
facias proceedings is. reversed and the appeal from the order refusing to enter judgment against Hooper is dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The distinction between "debt" and "claim," attempted in Hollldaysburg Borough vs. Snyder, 258 Pa. 490, is somewhat impalpable.
If the lien of debts is to be limited, it can be thought that at least
the same limitation will be applicable to "claims."
The 15th section of the Fiduciaries Act, P. L. 1917, p. 476, says
that "no debts of a decedent" shall remain a lien for more than one
year, unless suit is brought in that time against the executor or
administrator. No suit has been brought against the executor or
administrator, until more than three years after X's death.
The
liability of his lands to be taken In execution for "debts" or claims,
has become extinct. The court has properly refused to allow a
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judgment against Hooper, the devisee of the land. If there is any
personal property, payment by the borough may be obtained from
It, since only the six-year limitation is applicable to it.
The judgment of the learned court below Is
AFIRMED.
JOIES vs. SLOAN
Mortgages--Mortgage Bond-Release of Part of Mortgaged Premises-Discharge of Mortgagor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Action on bond for $2,000. A mortgage for $2,000 accompanied
the bond. Sloan later conveyed the mortgaged premises to X for
$4,000 of which $2,000 was to be paid to the mortgagee. Subsequently the mortgage was released as to a part of the premises.
Later the mortgage was enforced as to the other part and not
enough was made to pay the debt. $1,000 of it remained unpaid.
This is an action to recover on the bond this $1,000.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Teel for the Plaintiff.
Sternthai, for the Defendant.
VERBLUN, J.
This is a
case, which
necessitates
some
thought, although
much
discussion is
not required
to
express an opinion.
The counsel for the plaintiff has presented a very able
argument
but
has
made one serious
mistake.
That is in this.
The fact that an inference might
be drawn that Jones knew of the transaction between Sloan and X
and acquisced in it, is not a good reason for drawing an inference
that Sloan was acquiescent in the release of part of the mortgaged
premises. The reason for my so believing is this. If Jones did not
know and acquiesce in the transfer from Sloan to X, still that would
not change Sloan's position. He was liable on this bond whether
Jones had knowledge and acquiesced or whether he had no knowledge and had not agreed to the transfer. 27 Cyc 1335.
On the other hand if Sloan did not know of Jones' release of
part of the premises and acquiesced in this transfer, Sloan was released from liability. Estate of James Hunter, 257 Pa. 32. For this
reason I think the plaintiff's case has no foundation and there can
be no recovery here.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Sloan gave a mortgage and a bond for $2,000. He subsequently
conveyed the land for $4,000, of which $2,000 were to be paid to the
mortgagee. Instead of enforcing this duty of the purchaser, by pro-

72
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ceeding on the mortgage, Jones released a part of the premises
from the lien of the mortgage, without consent of Sloan.
The residue
of the premises has not paid the remainder of the debt. We think,
however, that by the release, Jones took the risk of the sufficiency
of the premises not released to pay the debt. He can not recur to
Sloan. The release may have been of a disproportionate amount of
the mortgaged lands for the share of the debt which was paid. Indeed, the release may have been gratuitous. It would be unjust to
allow Jones to deal capriciously with the land, at the expense of
Sloan. "By such release," says Walling J., "the mortgagee assumes
the risk of the unreleased portion of the property being of sufficient
value to secure his debt."
Estate of James Hunter; 257 Pa. 43;
Meigs vs. Tunnicliffe, 214 Pa. 495.
In affirming the judgment below, we must say that the opinion
Indicates no effort to comprehend the case, and It Is scarcely worthy
of the ability of the writer.
Affirmed.
SLATER vs. ANDREWS
Negotiable Instruments-Promissot Notes--Accommodation Endorse.
ment-Forgery-1901 Negotiable Instrument Act, P. L. 194
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A note for $1000.00 payable to X or order was made by Y for
the accommodation of Y and to induce some one to advance the
$1000.00 on it Slater's name was written on the back of it by Z,
who had no precedent authority to do so. The note was then accepted for a consideration by P.
P demanded payment of it after
maturity from Slater who though not bound by the signature decided to pay and paid it.
Andrews an earlier endorser is sued by
Slater.
Morines for the Plaintiff.
Mervine for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SPENGLER, J. We hold that the plaintiff can not recover on
the note. The important question in this case is, whether this is a
forgery.
If so, can it be ratified? Forgery is the false making of
an instrument or materially altering one, with intent to defraud,
which, If genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal liability. In the case at bar Z wrote the name of the
plaintiff on the back of the note with no authority to do so. When Z
did this he performed the first essential of a forgery, namely, the
false making or materially altering an instrument. The facts clearly
bring out the point that the name of the plaintiff was placed on it
with the Intent to defraud, i.e., to induce some one to advance the
$1000.00.
When Z did this, he performed the second essential of a
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forgery. "It is forgery to sign another man's name to a note,
without authority, and with intent to defraud, and thus make the
instrument appear to be a note of the person whose name is signed."
Clark, on Law of Crimes, Par. 394.
The plaintiff contends that the act of Z can be ratified. It is
needless to point out that a forgery can not be ratified. It has been
held in this state by a long line of decisions that a forgery can not
be ratified. Shisler vs. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447; Garret vs. Gontor, 42
Pa. 146; Building and Loan Assn. vs. Walton, 181 Pa. 201; Hall vs.
Underwood, 11 Forum 188. The entire argument of the plaintiff is
based on the case of Hall vs. Underwood, 11 Forum 188. This case
is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the first place
the court there held that it was not a case of forgery. The court
said: "He did not, apparently, forge it, for he was known by both
Rhone and Hall, not to be Underwood and to sign the name of the
latter, as agent and he professes thus to sign it." This same case
holds that "a ratification for forgery is void; but a ratification of an
act which is not a forgery, imparts validity." In the case at bar
there existed no agency, real or apparent. In 181 Pa. 201, the
Supreme Court expressed itself very emphatically upon the subject
of the ratification of a forgery, in which it said: "Forgery does not
admit of ratification. The forger does not act on behalf of, nor
profess to represent, the person whose handwriting he counterfits, and the subsequent adoption of the instrument can not supply
the authority."
The court does not deny that an unauthorized act of an agent
may be ratified on the part of the principal. But in this case Ithere
existed no agency.
In the next place the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
Act of 1901 do not permit this action. Section 19 provides that the
"signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent.
No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose;
and the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases
of agency." Apparently this section seems to give the plaintiff a
right to the action. But the court contends that the act was not
intended as a backward step but to improve the principles applicable to negotiable instruments. When the legislature used the
words "as In other cases of agency" it no doubt, intended that the
words applied to the case where there was an apparent agency, or
an agency as in a case of necessity. Taking some of the other provisions of the act into consideration we certainly can not give the
interpretation of the plaintiff. Section 23 provides "When a signature Is forged or made without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, it Is wholly inoperative and no rightto enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such slgnatur'e, unless the party, against
whom it Is sought to enforce such right, Is precluded from setting
up the forgery or want of authority." This section is not applicable
to the plaintiff, for the exception applies to a party defendant.
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Again we wish to call attention to the words "without authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be." The facts of the
case state that Z had not authority. Section 66 provides "Every
endorser who endorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course,-that on due presentment, he will paythe amount to the holder, or to any subsequent endorser who may
be compelled to pay." In the case at bar the plaintiff was absolutely
under no legal duty to pay it. No party whose name was legally
upon the instrument could have compelled Slater to pay. The facts
of the case bring out the point that Slater even knew that he was
not bound upon the instrument, but that in spite of it, he decided
to pay. He was clearly a volunteer, and as such he could not recover under this provision. Section 119 provides: "A negotiable instrument is discharged (4) by any other act which will discharge a
simple contract for the payment of money." When Slater paid the
note knowing that he was not bound by it, he discharged the nqte,
and all parties liable on It, were thenceforth discharged from any
further liability. Slater paid the note and his position is that of a
person who takes with notice of infirmities. Section 124 provides
that: "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without
the consent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as,
against a party who has himself authorized or assented to the alteration, and subsequent endorsers." Section 125 defines as an alteration
any change in the number of parties or the relation of the parties.
The conclusion of the court is that the facts establish a forgery,
that a forgery can not be ratified, that where one writes the name
of another on the back of a note without any precedent authority,
and with the Intent to defraud, the person whose name is so written
thereon acquires no right under such an instrument against the
previous endorsers, and that when money is voluntarily paid, without request of the defendant, and with full knowledge of the facts,
can not recover such money.
The court renders judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The signing of Slater's name by Z seems, as the learned court
below concludes, to have been a forgery. It was without Slater's
authority. It would not be the less a forgery, if Z believed that Slater would pay the note, as he actually has done.
The principle Is clear, in this state, that validity can not be
given to a forgery, by a ratification. But, Is this principle applicable? It would be were the effort to bind Slater, on the ground that
he had ratified the endorsement. But, n1 attempt Is made to bind
him on that or any other ground. He has chosen to pay and had
paid the note, that is has beqome the buyer of it. It is his property.
Will the court say that he is not the owner of it? We do not think
it should.
As owner, he makes no use of his own endorsement. He can
select any one of the series of endorsers, having given the one
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selected proper notice of the non-payment of the note at maturity,
and compel such person to pay. He has selected Andrews an earlier
endorser. Why is he not to be paid by Andrews? Surely not, because he volunteered to buy the note, or, to pay the note. Cf. Hazelwood Brewing Co. vs. Siebert, 258 Pa. 9. He could not be deprived
of this right, by the forgery of his name as an endorser.
From the conclusion of the learned court below, sustained as it
is by a careful and well written opinion, we must dissent.
Reversed.
MASLIN'S ESTATE
Decedents Estate-Wills--Corporation Stock-Surplus Profits--Dividends of Corporation-Life-tenant's Estate.-Estate of
Remaindermen
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Maslin owned 100 shares ($50 per share par) of the stock of the
X Company. At his death it had a surplus of $100,000. He gave
the stock inj trust for his widow for life; remainder to his children.
A year after his death, the surplus was divided by a stoclt dividend
among the stock holders. Maslin owning one-tenth of the stock,
200 shares were alloted to the trustee. The widow claimed it. Ten
years later, taken out of the profits earned during that time, another stock dividend of 50 shares was declared. The widow claimed
this also.
Siegel for the Plaintiff.
Parnell for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KAUFFMAN, J. The questions presented by the facts of this
case are: (1) Whether a stock dividend declared upon stock in the
hands of a trustee from surplus accumulated before the death of the
testator or creator of trust is to be considered as part of the corpus
or as income to go to the life tenant? (2) Whether a stock dividend declared upon the same stock from earnings after the death
of the creator of the trust is to be considered as a part of the
corpus or as income?
In Earp's Appeal 28 Pa. 368, the Supreme Court in an opinion
by C. J. Lewis, held that, the portion of the surplus profits accumulated before the death of the testator was an incident of the
stock at the time of the death of the testator, and, therefore, was
part of the corpus and should go to the trustee. But, that the surplus earned subsequent to the death of the testator was clearly
income, and that regardless of the form in which the income was
distributed it belonged to the beneficiary of the trust income, i.e.,
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the life tenant. In that case, the testator devised certain stocks
in trust for his children for their lives. Large surplus profits had
accumulated upon the stock at the time of the death of the testator
and continued to accumulate subsequent to his death, for several
years. A stock dividend of 150 per cent. was then declared and
issued out of the surplus profits. The principle laid down in this
case has been repeatedly followed by our courts. Among the latest
cases are Sloan's Estate, 258 Pa. 368 and McKeon's Estate, 263
Pa. 78.
Judgment is rendered accordingly. The 200 shares are alloted
to the trustee, which is the portion of the surplus profits accumulated before the death of testator, and the 50 shares which represents
the surplus earned subsequent to the death of the testator, are
alloted to the widow.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
All the property of the corporation, after paying its debts, equitably belonged to the stockholders. Maslin at his death, owned onetenth of the then surplus, as well as of the other property; i.e., so
much of the corporate property, as equalled the par value of the
existing shares. When he bequeathed the shares he bequeathed the
right to one-tenth of this surplus which was attached to it. But,
as he did not bequeath the shares absolutely, to the widow, but only
the right to the dividends on them, during her life, so he did not
bequeath the right to any part of the accumulations, but only the
right to the interest or dividends therein, during her lifetime.
Merely changing the form of the right, involved no change in its
substance. It was before undivided in conception; but dividing it,
into so-called shares, and alloting these shares to the holders of the
pre-existing shares, makes no important difference. The court has
properly concluded that this accumulated property does not change
its ownership, by the stock-dividend. As it was before, the property of the trustee as of the other stockholders, so it remains. The
duty on him is to account for the earnings of it, as they arise in
the future, and the life tenant will be entitled to such as accrue during his life.
The stock that was issued to absorb earnings made since the
holder's life, belongs to the life tenant. The money it represents
is earnings which might have been, possibly should have been
divided earlier, and in money. That the corporation has detained
these earnings, and instead of paying them to the stockholders In
money, has declared additional stock, can not change the ownership
of this stock. The earnings, as they accrued, were divisible among
the stockholders, those for life, and those absolutely, and the same
persons are entitled to the additional stock that would have been
entitled to the money dividends where place has been taken by the
stock. Sloan's Estate, 258 Pa. 368, is sufficient authority.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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NEFF vs. OTT
CredibilityEvidence---Vitness--Cross-Examination conduct of Witness

Former Mis-.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A witness for Neff was cross-examined by defendant for the
purpose of discrediting him, whether 22 years before he had not
kept a place for gambling, and 10 years before a saloon where liquor
was Illegally sold, and whether he had not lived in adulterous relaVerdict for defendant.
tions. The court allowed the questions.
Motion for new trial.
Rose for the Plaintiff.
Reynolds for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHOENILY, J. The court In the trial of the cause, permitted
the following questions in the cross-examination of a witness for
the plaintiff: (1) Whether 22 years before, he had not kept a place
for gambling? (2) Whether 10 years before, he had not kept a saloon where liquor was illegally sold? (3) Whether he had not lived
in adulterous relations? These questions were asked for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the witness by discrediting
him.
The questions, of themselves, were improper, and should not
have been permitted. Comm. vs. Payne, 205 Pa. 101; Comm. vs.
Williams, 209 Pa. 529; Comm. vs. Varano, 258 Pa. 422; Marshall vs.
Carr, 271 Pa. 271.
Counsel for the defendant does not deny the impropriety of the
questions nor question the authority of the cases cited in support
of their inadmissability. But, he contends that since the questions
were answered, the party who called the witness could not object.
This contention is evidently based on the rule that it is the personal privilege of the witness to decline to answer such questions as
may tend to incriminate him, and having answered them, the party
calling the witness can not object.
We do not think however, that this rule Is appliable to the
case at bar. The witness could not have been prosecuted if he
answered the first two questions In the affirmative, since the time
of the commission of the acts mentioned Is too remote for prosecution. Under Section 77 of the Act of March 31, 1860 (P. L. 450),
2 Purdon 2298, all Indictments and prosecutions for all misdemeaners, perjury excepted, must be brought within two years after such
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misdemeanor was committed. The witness could therefore,
have incriminated himself in answering the questions.

not

The facts of the case do not show as of what time the witndss
But whether the
was accused of living in adulterous relations.
witness would have incriminated himself or not by answering this
question is Immaterial to a decision of this case, in view of the
plaintiff's right to object to the admission of the first two questions.
We think that the improper admission of the first two questions and answers unfairly prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff's case. A substantial Injustice has therefore, been done the
plaintiff, and a new trial should be granted.
Motion for a new trial granted, and a new trial ordered.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Neff expected to win a verdict against Ott, the Alefendant, by
the testimony of a witness. The influence of this testimony deHe was asked
pended on the apparent credibility of the witness.
on cross-examination, by the defendant, whether 22 years before
he had not kept a gambling place, and 10 years before a saloon.
To have done so would lesen the credit of the witness in the mind
of a jury. Was this mode of impairing his credit permissible? According to Marshall vs. Carr, 271 Pa. 271, there are two objections
to the mode: (a) When a reputation is relied on, to impeach a witness, it should be comparatively recent reputation, not so old as
22 years or 10 years, and, were evidence of bad conduct (not reputation) depended on to discredit the witness, the discrediting facts
should be "misconduct of a comparatively recent date."
(b) The other objection Is that "It is well settled in this state
that a witness may not be cross-examined as to his alleged misconduct, or even criminal acts, entirely disconnected with the case
on trial." That this principle is well settled we must believe, not
because we have found a consistent assertion of it, but because the
last dictum of the law making body has affirmed it.
Similar objections can be made to the question whether the
witness had not lived In adulterous relations.
When, does not appeal.
The object of the question is to impair the credibility of the
witness, In the, Judgment of the jury. It will naturally and legiti2nately do so, but the Jury must not be permitted to know too
much of the reliability of the witnesses. It must be left to grope
after satisfaction as to their dependability.
The judgment is affirmed.
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ELIZA CAMPBELL vs. THE COAL COMPANY
Negligence-Mines and Mining-Master and Servanb---Props for
Support-Failure to Furnish-Relative Duties of Mne
Owner and Mine Foreman-Act of June 2,
1891, P. L. 176-Act of June 1, 1915,
P. L. 712
STATME;NT OF FACTS
Campbell, husband of the plaintiff, was working in the anthracite coal mine of the defendant. He made a demand on the mine
foreman for props to support the roof of the chamber where he
was working, but the foreman neglected to furnish any. Ten days
later he requested the superintendent to furnish props. He promised to do so but failed to furnish them for a week. Campbell,
working in the chamber at the end of the week, was overwhelmed
by falling roof and crushed to death. His widow sues the company. The defense is that the negligence was that of the mine
foreman for which the defendant is not liable.
Reese for the Plaintiff.
R. Morgan for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WITLINGER, J. The question in the case at bar is whether
or not the owner of an anthracite mine can prevent a recovery by
the plaintiff upon the ground that the negligence perpetrated was
that of the mine foreman for which he, the owner, would not be
liable.
The early law in Pennsylvania as to the effect of this defense
was set forth in Durkin vs. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, as follows: "It has been long settled that a mining boss or foreman is
a fellow servant with the other employees of the same master engaged in a common business, and that the master is not liable for
an injury caused by the negligence of such mining boss." This
case cited Lehigh Valley Coal Co. vs. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; Delaware
& Hudson Canal Co. vs. Carrol, 89 Po. 374; Waddell vs. Simoson,
112 Pa. 567.
In 1891, an act was passed, P. L. 176, relating to anthracite
coal mines. Under this act it was necessary and obligatory that
the mine owner employ a mine foreman who had been certified to
by the state. It also attempted to impose liability upon the mine
owner for the negligence of the mine foreman. (Section 8, Art.
17). This part of the act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Durkin vs. Kingston Coal Co., supra., in so far as it at-
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tempted to impose liability on the mine owner for the failure of
the mine foreman to comply with the provisions of the act which
The latest case
compels his employment and defined his duties.
which states this to be the rule is Lynett vs. Scranton Coal Co.,
269 Pa. 554.
The relation of the mine foreman to the mine operator as fixed
by the Act of 1891, and as defined in Durkin vs. The Coal Co.,
supra, was greatly changed by the amendment to that Act approved
The Act of 1891 provided that It should
June 1, 1915, P. L. 712.
not be lawful for any person to act as mine foreman unless registered as a holder of a certificate of qualification or service under
the act; but , the amendment adds this provision, "Unless, in the
judgment Of the employer, he is a person possessed of qualifications
The
which make him equally competent to act In such position."
amending act further provides that the owners "shall have supervision, direction and control of the mine foreman," and that the
mine foreman shall be the agent of the operator.
On June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, the Workmen's Compensation Act
was passed, which defined the liability of the employer to the emSection
ployee for Injuries received in the course of employment.
201 provides that in any action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee in the course of his employment, or
for death resulting from such injury, it shall not be a defense, (a)
that the injury was caused in whole or in part by the negligence
of a fellow employee, or (b) that the employee had assumed the
risk, or (c) that the injury was caused by the negligence of the employee.
Section 202 provides, "The employer shall be liable for the
negligence of all employees, while acting within the scope of their
employment, including mine foreman,, fire bosses, mine superintendent, and all other employees licensed by the state or other governmental authority if the employer from the class of persons thus
licensed; and such employees shall be the agents and representatives of their employers and the employers shall be responsible for
the acts and neglects of such employees, as in case of other agents
and employees of their employers, and notwithstanding the employment of such employees, the property in and about which they
are employed, and the use and operation thereof, shall be at all
times under the supervision, management and control of their
employers."
That this act was constitutional was held in Anderson vs. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33.
In the light of the foregoing statutes it is readily seen that
whatever may have formerly been the sufficiency of the defense set
Moreover, the facts of the case at bar
forth it is now of no effect.
show that the superintendent had also received notice and even
prior to the passage of the acts of 1915. it was held that In such
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case the mine owner was responsible for the negligence of the superintendent.
Collins vs. The Coal Co., 241 Pa. 55; Sudnik vs.
The Coal Co., 257 Pa. 226.
Under the above cited acts of 1915 the
mine owner is clearly liable for the negligence of his superintendant.
The defense in this case has been wholly confined to that above
stated, namely, that the negligence was that of the mine foreman
for which the defendant is not liable.
No other question was
raised and in view of the above mentioned authorlties we are convinced that the defense is not a good one.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
It is unnecessary to prolong the discussion of this case. We
affirm the judgment of the court below, upon its able opinion.
AFFIRMED.

JENKINS vs. TRUST CO.
Will-Trust and Trustees--Perpetuity-Rule Against PetpetuitiesIntention-Effect of Voidness of Ultimate Trust
Upon Intermediate Trusts
Broomall for the Plaintiff.
Rose for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SIEGEL, J.
This is a bill by Jenkins, one of the children of
the testator to have the trust created by the testator's will annulled, and to compel the trustee, the Trust Co., to convey the
trust property to the children of the testator.
The facts of the
case, as presented by the bill are that John Jenkins, the testator,
devised land to the Trust Company, in trust to pay the income to
his children, or the survivor or survivors of them and on the
death of the last to pay the income to the children of the children.
for their lives, and to the survivors or survivors of them, and then
to convey the land on the death of the last survivor of the grandchildren to the living children, that is, the testator's great grandchildren, as tenants In common.
Does the final disposition of the trust property violate the rule
against perpetuities? The learned counsel for the respondent has
directed some argument to this point.
The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of contingent interest in real or personal property, either legal or equitable, which must not vest within a life or lives in being and twenty-
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one years thereafter.
Tiffany -on Real Property, page 344.
If
there is any possibility that a violation of the rule may occur, the
interest attempted to be created is void.
Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa.
143.
It is evident from the facts of the case that the final interest
created is contingent.
The parties in whom the corpus of the
trust is to vest cannot be determined until the death of all the
grand-children of the testator.
It is also clearly evident from the facts, we think, that there
is a great possibility that the trust estate will not vest within the
period allowed by the rule.
By the will, the gift of the income of
the trust estate to the children and the grand-children, and the
gift of the corpus to the great-grand-children, is made in each case,
as a gift to a class. No names are mentioned.
The corpus of the
trust is not to vest in the great grand-children until after the death
of all the grand-children, whether now born or to be hereafter born.
Even if there were grand-children living at the death of the testator, we think it is clear, that the vesting of the estate is postponed
for a period which transcends the period allowed by the rule.
We therefore, find that the final disposition of the corpus of
the estate, as attempted by the testator, violates the rule against
perpetuities, and is void.
We now come to the consideration of the second and more difficult question of the ease.
The ultimate trust to the great grandchildren being void, does its voidness affect the intermediate trusts
and render them void also?
The determination of this question, we belieeve, is dependent
upon a determination of the paramount intention of the testator in
creating the trust, to be gathered from his will.
If the testator, intended, In the creation of the trust, that the
trust should exist as a means to effect the final disposition of his
property i. e. that the testator's paramount intention in tying up
his property in a trust estate, was to insure that it descended unimpaired to the final beneficiaries, the voidness of the final trust
voids the intermediate trusts and renders the entire devise invalid,
since it Is a well settled doctrine that a trust will not be sustained if
the object of its creation is unattainable.
This rule appears to be the basis for holding of our Supreme
Court In declaring the intermediate trusts void In the cases of
Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179; Gerber's Estate, 196
Pa.
336;
Kountz's Estate (No. 1), 213 Pa. 390; Gessler vs. Reading Trust
Co., 257 Pa. 329, and Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 243.
But if the dominant intent of the testator was to provide for
his children and the creation of the void portion of the devise was
only to prevent alienability by the children, so that they could not
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Imperil their enjoyment of the Income during their lives, and the
valid limitation is practically possible of separation from the void,
then the entire devise will not be struck down, but effect will be
given to the valid portions of it.
On these grounds are based the decisions in Moore's Estate,
198 Pa. 611: Goddard's Estate, 198 Pa. 454; Whitman's Estate, 24S
Pa. 285.
In Ewalt vs. Davenhill, 257 Pa. 385, the decision of the
court Is based upon the ground that the valid trust is practically
severable from the invalid trust.
The statement of the court, in
that case, that "where an active trust of the corpus Is created to
pay the income to one for life, it will not be defeated because of
the failure or invalidity of the gift over of the estate," we think is
not necessary to the decision of the case, and Is obiter dicta, unwarranted by the decisions in previous cases In which the question
was involved.
The doctrine of our courts on the question before us was concisely summarized by Mr. Justice Kephart in Lilley's Estate, supra.
"It does not follow that simply because the ultimate interests are
void, the prior interests too must collapse; only offending limitations are void.
But in Pennsylvania, where the limitation of the
prior and ulterior estates are so intimately and Inseparably Intertwined that the failure of the latter disturbs the main and dominant
purpose of the testator, of which the prior limitations are a part,
such prior and ulterior estates are void; so too when the prior estate Is but a mere agency to accomplish a transgression of the
rule."
There undoubtedly Is always very great room for error in

de-

termining what the paramount object of the testator was.
The
court's interpretation of the paramount Intent of the testator in
the cases of Johnston's Estate, supra, and Gerber's Estate, supra,
has been criticized by eminent authority in 12 Forum 154-155.
But after a careful consideration of the language of the testator's will, we have come to the conclusion that the case at bar
comes within the class of cases governed by the latter part of the
rule as enunciated by Mr. Justice Kephart.
We think that the
paramount intention of the testator In creating the trust was not
so much to provide for his children, but to prevent his children
and grand-cbildren from squandering his estate and thus deprive
his further removed descendants of any interest therein.
If the
testator had desired merely to provide for his children, he could
have, and undoubtedly would have, given them the property in fee.
If he feared that his children would Imperil and destroy their income from the estate by alienating It,
the testator could have
created a trust estate for their benefit with the power of appoint-
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But he did not do
ment to dispose of the estate at their death.
that. He directs specifically to whom the corpus is to go.
Whitman's Estate, supra, has been cited in several late cases
as authority for the proposition that intermediate estates are not
It is so cited in
infected by the voidness of the ultimate estate.
Price's Estate, 260 Pa. 376.
We do not think that the true doctrine of the case is broad enough to warrant such citation.
In that case the testator bequeathed his estate to trustees with
directions to pay the net income to his wife for life; upon her death
to his daughter for life, "free from the control of any husband she
may now have or hereafter take;" upon the death of said daughter
to divide the principal among the children of said daughter in
equal shares, the shares of any male children to be paid to them on
their, respectively, attaining the age of 21 years; the shares of the
female children, to be held in like trust as declared for the daughter, and upon the decease of any of the female grand-daughters, to
divide and pay over their respective shares to their lawful issue,
and in ease the daughters died without leaving issue, then the
corpus to be paid to charities. The court held that the dominant
intent of the testator was to provide for his wife and only child during her life; that the subsequent limitation to the daughter's descendants were secondary; and that the ultimate trust was practicably severable from the intermediate trust, and that though the ultimate trust was void, the intermediate trust to the daughter was
valid.
It is clearly evident from these facts that the testator Intended
to so dispose of his property that his wife first have the benefit of
it and then his daughter.
But in order that the daughter might
enjoy the estate free from any interference by a husband, the trust
is created.
This intention, we think, is clearly shown by the provision in the will that the daughter's income shall be free from the
control of any husband she may have or take. By the limitation
over to the charity, we think the testator further demonstrated
that his paramount intent was to provide for his wife and daugl-ter
and not to transmit the estate to his grand-children.
As the court
points out, the two estates in that case are practically severable,
since even if the gift to the grand-children and great grand-children
is declared void, the ultimate disposition will then be to the charity,
which is unquestionably valid, under the rule that a disposition to
a charity is not affected by the rule against perpetuities.
Act of
May 9, 1889 (P. L. 173).
In the case at bar, however, a practicable
severance of the void from the valid estates is not possible.
The
ultimate disposition being void, If the Intermediate estate Is considered not to be affected, who gets the corpus of the estate? Un-
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der such a holding, necessarily, the grand-children.
But the testator specifically stated in his will that they should only receive the
income.
The case of Geissler vs. Reading Trust Co., supra, presents
facts somewhat similar to those of the case at bar.
In that case, the testator had created a trust the income of
which was to go to certain children, by name, for life, and after
their death to their children as a class, and after the death of the
last of such grand-children, then the corpus to vest in the testator's great grand-children, per capita.
Although the opinion of
the lower court, approved by a per curiam opinion of the Supreme
Court, does not directly say what interpretation the court places
upon the intent of the testator from the facts, yet the cases cited
in support of the statement that, "the antecedent estate thus fails,
and the heirs at law of this testator are entitled to Immediate possession," indicate, we think, that the court believed the dominant
intent of the testator to be that the intermediate trusts should be
only a means of transmitting his estate to his great grand-children.
We conclude, therefore, that the testator in the case at bar desired to transmit his estate, unimpaired, to his great grand-children.
His intent, however, is violative of the law, and cannot be carried
out. The object of the trust being thus unattainable, the means
to attain that object must also fall, and the testator must be considered as having died intestate in so far as the property In question is concerned.
We cannot, however, grant the prayer of the petitioner in its
entirety.
The bill does not show affirmatively that the children of
the testator are his only heirs at law.
The testator having died intestate, as to the trust property, distribution must be made under
the intestate laws. The trust property will therefore be placed In
the hands of a duly qualified administrator, as provided for by Section 3 (c) of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, (P. L. 459), who will make
proper distribution of the property.
We therefore decree that the trust created by the will of John
Jenkins, deceased, be annulled, and direct that the trustee, the
Trust Company, transfer the trust property to the duly qualified
administrator, who will make proper distribution.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
We have read with much satisfaction the careful opinion of the
learned court below.
The rule against perpetuities applies to trust estates as well
as to others.
The gift of the legal estate to the great grand-children, is in
defiance of the rule.
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Should, however, the trust have been permitted to operate so
long as the beneficiaries of it took an interest, the vesting of which
was not unduly postponed?
It is difficult to harmonize the cases on the question whether,
if a series of trusts is created the whole series becomes void, if the
last term of the series is for any reason void.
The learned court below has possibly dealt with this question
as well as the state of the adjudications makes it possible to deal
with it.
The appeal from the decree Is DISMISSED.

ESTATE OF JOHN SLOAN
Contracts-Suretyship-Payments--Independent

Debt of Principal to

Same Obligee-Application of Payments-Decedent's Estates
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris lent $1,000, to Wim. Sloan, taking from him (a) his note
for $1,000, and (b) another note for $1,000, which was signed by
Wm. and John Sloan, (brothers). Subsequently, William contracted
to borrow from Harris to the extent of $2700.
He made payments
from time to time, not specifying the debt to which they should be
applied.
Harris, however applied them, without John's knowledge,
to the subsequent created debt. The result Is that none of the payments were appropfiated to the $1,000 debt, for which John Sloan
became surety. He has died. A claim for $1,000 is made upon the
note, against his estate.
Doehne, for Plaintiff.
Falvello, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COtIT
BORYS, J.
The questions to be determined by this court upon
the established facts stated above are: First, whether a creditor has
the right to apply a payment, made by his debtor, to a debt that is
least secured.
Second, whether the estate of John Sloan shall be
liable for the promissory note of $1,000, upon which he as surety
was jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor, when
payments were applied without notice.
Considering the first question, the general rule, found in 39
Cyc. 1233, is stated as follows: "A creditor may apply a payment
voluntarily made by the debtor, without any specific appropriation,
where there are two or more debts, to whichever debt he pleases."
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In the case before us there were two debts; one secured, the
other unsecured.
There was a number of payments made by the
debtor to the creditor and each time the debtor failed to inform the
creditor to what debt to apply the payments.
In the absence of
such stipulation it appears the creditor applied the payments to the
debt that was least secured.
In Hoover vs. Summerville, 67 Pa., Super. 547, concerning the
rule relating to the application of partial payments, the court said:
"The debtor may direct and control their application; in the absence of any such direction by the debtor, the creditor may make
their application; and in the absence of any application thereof by
either debtor or creditor, the law will make the application in accordance with the equities of the parties, generally making It to
the first or older indebtedness, preferring however the -unsecured
to the secured claims."
The following cases are cited as authority
for the rule, supra; Chestnut St. Trust, Etc. Co. vs. Hart, 217 Pa.
506; Richard's Est., 185 Pa. 155; Creasy vs. Reformed Church, 1
Pa. Super. 572.
In view of the Pennsylvania decisions the conclusion is, therefore, that the creditor properly applied the payments
to the debt least secured.
. Considering the second question, the rule, founded in 32 Cyc.
171, provides: "If the lrincipal when making the payment omits to
designate how he wishes the money to be applied, the credttor may
apply it to any part of the indebtedness of the principal, a surety
not having any right to insist upon the application to the debt for
which he is liable, nor does it make any difference that the surety was not aware of existence of any other Indebtedness of the principal than that for which the surety, became liable."
Arbuckle
vs. Chadwick, 146 Pa. 393, was decided in accordance with the
above rule.
As the weight of authority, seems to be that no notice to surety of application of payments to unsecured claim, was necessary,
had he been notified he would have had no right to Insist upon application of payment to note for which he was surety. His estate
is therefore liable, and the court must allow a recovery.
OPINION OP

SUPREME

COURT

A surety has a right to the application of securities given by
the debtor, for the same debt, not only those given when the surety became bound, but those given subsequently.
Spencer
on
Suretyship, p. 181.
It does not seem to follow that, if the creditor
receives a payment, having several claims, he is bound to apply
it to the debt for which the surety Is bound.
The r!ght of appropriation is with the debtor; or, he not appropriating, with the credi-
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tor. The latter is not bound to apply the payment in discharge of
the surety.
The decision of the learned court below acords with
several cases in this state, the latest of which is Markert's Estate,
252 Pa. 622. The judgment Is therefore
AFFIRMED.

